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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
MATTHEW DESPAIN, 
OPENING BRIEF OF 
: APPELLANT 
Case No. 20010761 CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has 
appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (1953 as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right after a guilty plea was entered pursuant to Rule 1 l(i) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant reserved the right to appeal the trial 
court's ruling on his motion to suppress. (R.66) The appeal is taken from a final judgment 
of conviction for the offense count of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and Equipment, 
a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37d-4 (1953 as amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
After stopping a vehicle for an equipment violation, did the officers exceed the 
scope of detention allowed for a such a stop by asking an investigatory question regarding 
the appellant's possession of weapons without an articulable suspicion that the appellant 
was presently armed or dangerous? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Factual determinations made on a motion to suppress are reviewed pursuant to a 
clearly erroneous standard. Legal determinations and the application of facts to a legal 
standard are reviewed without deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256 (Utah, 1993). A trial court's determination of whether a particular set of facts 
establishes a reasonable suspicion is reviewed for correctness with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of legal standard to the facts. State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 466 (Utah, 1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in a seven count Information (R. 3-5). That Information 
alleged that the appellant had committed the following offenses: Count 1: Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and Equipment, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §52-37d-4 (1953 as amended); Count 2: Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as 
amended); Count 3: Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Correctional Facility, a 
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Third Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-311.3 (1953 as amended); 
Count 4: Reckless Endangerment, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-112 (1953 as amended); and Count 6: Carrying a Concealed Dangerous 
Weapon, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504(1) (1953 as 
amended). The seventh count of the Information was a forfeiture demand relating to both 
the truck the defendant was driving and the currency he possessed at the time of his 
arrest. 
A motion to suppress was heard on November 15, 2000 (R. 57-58). The trial court 
issued a written ruling denying that motion on December 7, 2001. The defendant entered 
a guilty plea to Count 1 of the Information and consented to a forfeiture of the currency 
seized from his person. (R. 63-71, 74-75) On August 15, 2001, sentence was imposed for 
the Second Degree Felony. (R. 77-81) The indeterminate prison sentence of one to fifteen 
years was suspended and the appellant was placed on probation for a period of 36 months. 
(R. 77-81) A notice of appeal was filed on September 15, 2001. (R. 85-85) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 6, 1999, Heber City Police Officers Troy Slaugh and Rusty Olsen 
were on patrol during the graveyard shift. (R. 106 at p. 5) Shortly after midnight, Slaugh 
observed a pickup truck towing a trailer at the intersection of State Roads 40 and 189 in 
Heber City. (R. 106 at p. 6, 52) The trailer did not have an operable rear license plate 
light. (R.106 at p.6) Slaugh stopped the vehicle for that violation. (R.106 at p.6) As the 
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officers approached the vehicle, a large rottweiler dog came at them from the trailer or the 
bed of the pickup. (R. 106 at p. 7) Due to the presence of the dog, the officers requested 
the appellant to get out of the vehicle. (R. 106 at p.2) The officers had requested appellant 
meet them at them at a position that was away from the dog. (R. 106 at p. 8) 
After the appellant approached the officers, Slaugh requested his driver's license 
and registration. (R. 106 at p. 10) As the appellant turned over his license, Olsen asked if 
appellant had any weapons. (R. 106 at p. 10) The appellant stated that he had two knives. 
(R. 106 at p. 11) Olsen asked the question about weapons because about one month 
earlier he had stopped the appellant. (R. 51) At that time the appellant was carrying a 
firearm. (R. 51) At the time of the stop in the instant case, appellant was wearing a shirt 
that was not tucked into his pants. (R. 106 at p. 12) The appellant lifted his shirt and 
exposed a large knife was sheathed and attached to his belt. (R. 106 at p. 14) The knife 
was positioned lengthwise across his stomach. (R. 106 at p. 14) The appellant was 
wearing his shirt in a way that prevented the officers from seeing the knife (R. 106 at p. 
12) 
A second smaller knife was sheathed and attached to the appellant's belt. (R. 106 
at p. 13) The officers took the knives from the appellant. (R.106 at p. 11) Officer Slaugh 
then went to his patrol car to run a records check on the appellant. (R. 106 at p. 13) The 
officer also checked the state statute on concealed weapons. (R. 106 at p. 14) Based on 
the way the appellant had worn the sheath, the nature of the weapon and its potential uses, 
the officers arrested appellant for possession of a concealed dangerous weapon. (R. 106 at 
p. 15-16) 
The officers then began to search the appellant's vehicle incident to that arrest. (R. 
106 at p. 17) At that time, the appellant's wife was in the passenger seat of the vehicle, 
she was also requested to step out of the vehicle prior to the search. (R. 106 at p. 17) 
Officer Slaugh noticed a child asleep in the bed of the pickup truck. (R. 106 at p. 17) As 
officer Slaugh dealt with the child, officer Allred began to search the cab of the pickup 
truck. (R. 106 at p. 20) Just as the search commenced, at about that time, appellant's 
daughter stopped in her car. (R. 106 p. 18) She took custody of the dog and the child. (R. 
106 at p. 18) 
Officer Allred found a container with a small quantity of marijuana under the 
passenger seat. (R. 106 p. 21, 61) In a purple backpack that the appellant's wife said was 
hers, the officers located a glass pipe with marijuana residue in it. (R. 106 at p. 22) 
Officer Allred found a glass pipe used to smoke methamphetamine behind the middle of 
the seat. (R. 106 at pp. 61-62) The officers also inventoried the items in the truck bed and 
trailer. (R. 106 at pp. 24-25) They located paraphernalia that was consistent with the 
manufacture of methamphetamine. (R. 106 at p.26) Due to the nature of those materials, 
the officers decided to impound the vehicle and continue the search during the day time. 
(R. 106 at p. 54) 
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The following afternoon the search was resumed. (R. 106 at 29) At that time, the 
officers located a round bottom flask and ajar containing iodine pellets. (R. 106 at p. 30) 
After those discoveries, they decided to obtain a search warrant. (R. 106 at p. 32) The 
ensuing search resulted in the discovery of other chemicals including hydrogen peroxide 
and alcohol. (R. 106 at pp. 32-33) All of those items are used in the manufacture 
methamphetamine. (R.106 at p. 33) 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant's vehicle was stopped for an equipment violation. The appellant was 
the driver of the vehicle. As he complied with a request to provide the officers with his 
driver's license, the appellant was asked if he was in possession of any weapons. That 
was an investigatory question that was beyond the scope of the actions that an officer may 
take during a traffic stop. The only justification for the question was that the appellant had 
been arrested about one month earlier. At that time he was found to be in possession of a 
weapon. An individual's past criminal behavior cannot be the sole basis to establish a 
-6-
icasoitijIMk1 suspicion In <li l.iiiiii .nil indiuiliiiil I oiisoqiinilh , nlliccrs lacked llic requisite 
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to include investigatory 
questions about matters.unrelated to the basis for the stop,, The subsequent search violated 
Hit* lll'onjiilt J"Vmendment and the evidence seized dm my, lhal search must be ordered lo be 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
AN OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE OF APPELLANT'S 
PAST CRIMINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT MORE 
INFORMATION, FAII ,S ' '• • ESTABLISH \ 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 4 > ENGAGE IN 
INVESTIGATORY OTTESTTON VRFT-ATrr ~ o 
A TRAFFIC STOP, 
The issue of the presence of reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory 
.•questioning during a traffic stop in this case was ra^cw m a motion to suppress in the trial 
c si ib mission • af < • 1: itten 
memorandum, and. oral argument, the trial judge issued a written opinion. (R. i:^- *' ! hat 
document included factual findings. (R. 46-52) in mat ruling, the trial court denieo the 
n 10I11 in 11'! |hi Ihr 11/.iini i mi MI ill in lliir jipiKMl wir '.porifit fills iiiMirsnl in tllrii opinion. 
(R.48) 
The officers stopped the appellant for a motor vehicle equipment violation. (R. 52) 
Specifically, the stop was for a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-120(b) (1953 as 
amended). That statute requires that rear license plate on a vehicle be illuminated. The 
light over the rear license plate on the trailer that the appellant was towing was not 
functioning. (R. 52) After the appellant was stopped, the officers summoned him to the 
rear of the vehicle. (R. 51) As officer Slaugh requested appellant's driver's license and 
registration, Olsen asked if the appellant had any weapons. (R. 51) The reason why that 
question was asked was because the appellant had been arrested about one month earlier. 
(R. 51) At that time he was carrying a firearm. (R. 51) 
The stop of an automobile and detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all such warrantless searches, but only those are 
unreasonable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). A search or seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable if it meets a two prong test: First, the police officer's action 
must be justified from the inception. Second, the detention resulting from that action must 
be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the 
first place." Terry v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 1 at 19-20 (1968). 
With respect to traffic stops, the first part of this analysis is met if the stop is based 
on a traffic or equipment violation. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). The 
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J U j ' l / 
the test stating, 
Once th * ^ i,.P ; : <.\ ' \ Ator/.-i "must he 
temporary and last no lor.: m is necessary to efleciuate 
the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983) Both the "length and [the] scope of the detention must 
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 
761/763 (Utah 1991) 
X/J. I1" J'tlal I i L! • • ' 
This i/'O'inrt kid piTYiaush de'inibml the limitation i in lln M | , IIIM* ol lime 
detention for a traffic stop m Stale v. Robinson, 797 P.Ai 431 (Ut. App. 1990). The 
Lopez court adopted those limi; he court son stated, 
...ai, v, nicer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
•• •••. check and issue a citation However, once the driver has 
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement 
to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way, 
without being subjected to further dela> b;; police for 
additional questioning." 
797 P.2d at 435 In Lopez the court expanded the scope of the detention for a traffic stop 
b> allow ing officers to determine if the di i ver has arrest warrants as part of the computer 
check. 
As pre\ iously indicated, the scone of a trait K. stop does no! include questioning the 
driver about potential umiiiuu umduu Hun i> unicniko u> -U- \ Nation that provided the 
.9. 
basis for the stop. Event though the investigative questioning may be relatively short in 
duration, it is unreasonable if it extends the scope of the detention beyond the length 
necessary for the legitimate purposes of the step. See: United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675 (1985). In Lopez the court described the prerequisites for such questioning: 
Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on 
specific, articulable facts drawn from the totally of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop, 
[citation omitted] If reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still 
limited. The officer must "diligently [pursue] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to 
detain the defendant." 
873P.2datll32. 
In State v. Hansen, 17 P.3d 1135 (Ut. App. 2000), the court held that an officer's 
question to the driver of an automobile unreasonably extended the scope of the detention 
for a traffic stop. The officer asked the driver if he was in possession of any drugs, 
alcohol or weapons. The driver responded in the negative and the officer then requested 
to search the vehicle. The traffic stop in Hansen was based on an improper turn and 
driving without insurance. The driver had done nothing to indicate that drugs, alcohol or 
weapons were in the car. Nor had the officer made any observations that would justify the 
investigative questions. The court in Hansen held that such questioning was not justified 
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1»s iiiii\ reasonable suspicion ('oiisequenlly, the evidence that was discovered as a result 
ofthat questioning was inadmissable. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of the presence of reasonable 
suspicion to conduit a search for weapons in several contexts, In Micl ligan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1U32 i l*)> i in nllii ITS ubsmnl «i u Inrlt1 h iiii1 IIIM HI rinln lib I'lir IIIIIIM I I IIIIIIIII  i i 
corner then drove off the road into a »:i\ - The drnei. Long, met officers at the rear of 
the vehicle, Vv hen requested to produ^ ,-AC •. ehuk registration, Long began to walk 
t "1 In „" jU i i ' iTS n b • 
Long was stopped and the officers looked inside the vehicle. They discovered observ ed a 
pom; *°* wns later fo™J *~ —*~:~ mariiuonr* The C-HJIJ ft-au' 'h\e those 
uri iitnst.intees instil - ,* •:. , 
The circumstances establishing a tcaaonabie suspv ion included the erratic driving J 
culminating in a single car accident, the driver's appearance of beinu under ilk- influence 
of an iiitnxin .nil ami (lie Insl hand obseiwihon ot the hunting kinle in the area about to be 
re-entered by Long. 
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 I J.S. 10f> ;"977h the defendam had been stopped 
f'»i" 'Invilli.1 "Mil n» i:\(int'«l license plate I he ;->jpreme ( ^AXI iieie. ^ai there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation when the officers onlerul 11 it *!rlt IN'LIII'I In prl mil nil lln 
automobile Aftei exiting the cai , the offi.ce.rs observed, a bulge in the defendant's 
clothing that was consistent with a concealed weapon. That observation permitted the 
officers to conclude that the defendant was armed and "...posed a serious and present 
danger to the safety of the officers." 434 U.S. at 112. 
The defendant in Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972), had a firearm seized 
from his person as he was seated in a parked car. The officer who made the seizure had 
received information that the defendant was seated in a specified vehicle was carrying 
narcotics and a firearm. The court held that the information had sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify the officer's stop and subsequent search. As in Long, and Mimms the 
information available to the officers in Adams v. Williams allowed them to conclude that 
the defendant was presently armed and potentially posed a danger to them. 
In several cases, this court has addressed the question of whether officers have a 
reasonable suspicion to believe who a person that is the subject of a vehicle and stop 
poses a danger to them. The rulings have required that the information establish that the 
reasonable suspicion be of a present danger. In State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Ut. App. 
1992), the defendant was had been stopped for speeding. While obtaining the defendant's 
driver's license and vehicle registration, the trooper noticed a rifle in the hatchback 
portion of the vehicle. As the trooper was running a license check he observed the 
defendant move a bag toward him from the hatchback portion of the vehicle. When the 
trooper reapproached the vehicle he observed the bag. He asked the defendant about other 
firearms in the vehicle. The defendant denied that there were any. He then agree to let the 
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I r o n n r t ^ M i r l l l l l l l U ' l l l I K III" I I I I lllHlH i p i ' ! | i i M l l ' l l t i l l 11 II II l I II I 11 i l l l i n l II11 II II II 111 ( I ! I II | i I I I lllllll II l i e 
n Ik -ie had pre\ IOUSK obsrn cd was found to be stolen. 
. The cov* ; i M .:aju.;d. discussed the reasonable suspicion standard as it applied to a 
belief" llul ii s I -I ilanj.. i mir I Ii ml 'J.ilal, 
. ;^<.j; <:A oituer reasonably believes a Mispeci is dangerous 
and ma> obtair- nmnecuK Mniro1 »f weapons :* protective 
search * .. 'HK : Ah < .vt n.i- <IIUIKM active 
weapons search onix it "a reasonably pruden: | * u * the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or 
her] safety or that of others was in danger,"[citation omitted] 
839 P.2d at 870. Hie court held that under the circumstances in Bradford, a reasonable 
officer would hdicvc in.> safelx- xvnuld have been at risk The factors that the ^ourt relied 
L It'll* • l, , \ i ! .' >\ . : ,K* 
presence of the rifle and the defendant's furtive movements. 
. In State v. O'Brien. 959 P.2d 647 (I Jt. Api > 1998), the court, found that an officer 
hail a iCiisonuMi. suspii ion i I poh/nlinl II.IIIJH'I that allowed him to question the defendant 
about the presence of firearms. That suspicion a 1 so a 11 o w ed I m i m i in I loo Is i i I 11»1! 11 n a s se 11 \i e r 
compartment of the vehicle after «i 'Jnp for an equipment violation. The trooper in 
O i)Mt scivi'd llnil "ii' ul I lie nliuels on llic defendant's truck was wobbling. 
After the trooper turned on his overhead lights he saw the driver of th^ 
if he was trying to hide or recover something. When the vehicle was snapped, because of 
those obser vations, the officei had »•. ^Icudant step to the rear oi the truck The 
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observations provided a reasonable suspicion for the officer's questions to the defendant 
about his movements and the presence of weapons. They also provided a basis for the 
search of the vehicle. 
These rulings are consistent with those previously discussed from the Supreme 
Court. In all of these cases the officers had reasonable suspicions based on observations 
or information that allowed them to conclude that the defendants were presently in 
possession of weapons or otherwise posed a danger to the officers. In the instant case, the 
only justification for the investigatory question was the defendant's past criminal 
behavior. (R. 51) About one month earlier, he had been stopped and found in possession 
of a firearm. (R. 51) That information fails to establish a reasonable suspicion to believe 
that he possessed a weapon at the time of the stop at issue in this case. 
The cases that address the question of utilizing past criminal behavior as a basis for 
establishing a reasonable suspicion indicate that such behavior cannot be the sole 
determinate of reasonable suspicion. This position is consistent with the case law 
previously discussed. Reliance solely on past criminal behavior to establish a reasonable 
suspicion would fail to demonstrate that the defendant was presently armed or dangerous. 
Further, as a matter of policy, if past criminal behavior could be the sole basis to establish 
a reasonable suspicion, anyone who had any criminal history could be stopped or detained 
without any indication that they are presently committing or about to commit a crime. 
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The nsi «i.l ii.i'J »iiiiiiiiii! kliiiviiii lu establish reasonable suspicion was addressed 
in State v. Humphrey, 93? P.2d 137 (Ut. App 19 9 '/ ) I*" tl i. it t ^^ • a 1 lighw a.) pat i ol 
trooper stoppi ' .. • Montecelir ~Ttah hie defem*.* •* M* .. passenger in the 
vcl in 11 • 11 . . . . . . . . ;,obt ;ather was a highway patrol trooper. The trooper 
asked the female if he could search the \eliiiele Slir utiiisetileil hul lln ileleniLiiiI u-llul „il 
her and fold her not to consent to the search. After releasing the two, the trooper received 
information from the father of the female.' I he father indicated that, his daughter had been 
usii ig dn igs and w as going oi it i ith a mai I v h : • as 
indicated that his daughter had told him that she had transported drugs from Arizona to 
Colorado. 
Based on lli.il minim.ilinn ofllm.s IIIII lln diej lujjwii In look Ini llie cai A second 
trooper observed the vehicle speeding without a front license piatc : * * 
'* .ndant was driving. The trooper who made the stop had known the female ana "ler 
linnils Inr im nil IIIIIIIIII I  MI nil! u\:ii 1 lie linopu spoke with tin female n i his patrol cai I le 
noticed that she was nervous and'that she made some statements ihni n en mini i niisisieni 
with her background When, they returned to the defendant's car, the female stated that 
„!ie Hii\ i einliiill I lie ildciulanl hai I ::Iecl a jacket to the trooper to give to the female. \ s the 
trooper passed the jacket to the female hi (ell a Innl nh|n I ill die |inekel Hi n nli|i i i 
was a container and when opened and found to contain drugs. A subsequent search of the 
vehicle resulted in the discove™ =., „ large quantity of methamphetamine. 
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The defendant argued that the trooper lacked a reasonable suspicion to detain him 
to conduct a investigation beyond that allowed for a traffic stop. In discussing the effect 
that the defendant's prior criminal behavior had on that analysis, the court stated, 
We recognize that consideration of the individual's past 
criminal history is not part of the probable cause 
delermination [citation omitted] However, information 
regarding an individual's past, and in this case ongoing, 
criminal activity can be a factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion. 
937 P.2d at 143. In addition to the historical information provided by the female's father, 
other information was relied upon to establish reasonable suspicion to question the couple 
beyond that allowed in a traffic stop. Those factors included that the direction of travel of 
the defendant was consistent with the information regarding travel from Arizona to 
Colorado, to transport drugs, the nervousness of both occupants and the statements of the 
female. 
In the State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Ut. App. 1993), the court also discussed the 
effect of past criminal activity on the reasonable suspicion analysis. The court indicated, 
...| A] previous arrest for criminal conduct may be relevant to 
a suspicion that a suspect might be presently dangerous, 
depending on the nature of the charge, but is not 
determinative 
856 P.2d at 661. In White the officers had received an anonymous tip that the defendant 
had been involved in a domestic disturbance and was on drugs. The source also described 
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where the defendant could be located, the car he was in and who he was with. It was also 
indicated that the defendant was on parole. 
The court found that the initial encounter with the defendant may have been 
justified . However, the subsequent search of his person and the car could not. The court 
found that the anonymous tip lacked reliability. The state attempted to justify the search 
of the defendant's person because he was on parole and was wearing a long coat that 
could conceal a weapon. The court rejected this argument based on the previously 
described reasoning relating to prior criminal activity. The court held that wearing a long 
coat was not a sufficient indication of dangerousness to justify a detention or search even 
when combined with knowledge of the defendant's criminal history. 
One Utah Supreme Court case involves the analysis of the defendant's prior 
criminal activity in determining if there was a reasonable suspicion to conduct a search, 
State v. RovbalL 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). In that case the defendant was arrested for a 
domestic disturbance in which shots were fired. At the time of the arrest no firearm was 
found. The defendant was released from jail the following morning. Shortly after being 
released, the defendant called the police with a complaint about a suspicious vehicle. 
When the police went to the area, the suspicious vehicle could not be located. The 
officers then encountered Royball, who leaned against a vehicle as if he was concealing 
something behind his back. The court held that the totality of these facts could 
reasonably support the conclusion that a weapon was available to the defendant. They 
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also could have concluded, based on the observations of the actions of the defendant, that 
he had a weapon concealed behind his back. The police conducted a pat down search of 
the defendant. A gun was found hidden in the defendant's pants in the small of his back. 
The appellant in this case was questioned about possessing weapons during his 
initial contact with the police officers. That questioning was investigative in nature and 
was beyond the scope of detention for a traffic stop. State v. Lopez, supra. Such 
questioning must be based a reasonable suspicion by the officers that the appellant was in 
possession of a weapon. State v. Lopez, supra. The officers did not actually observe a 
weapon. They did not observe any bulges in the appellant's clothing consistent with 
possession of weapons. They did not observe any furtive gestures or movements by the 
appellant that would lead them to infer that he was attempting to arm himself. Nor did 
they have any confidential information that he was possessing a weapon. The only 
information thait the officers had was that the appellant was involved in a previous 
encounter with the police where he was found to be armed. That encounter was about one 
month earlier. That information alone is not sufficient to establish that the appellant 
constituted a present danger to themselves or others at the time of the stop or detention at 
issue in this case. 
The seizure of the knives following the investigative question was the direct result 
of the Fourth Amendment violation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
The subsequent arrest of the appellant for the concealed weapon offense also resulted 
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from the initial Fourth Amendment violation. The search of the truck and trailer further 
resulted from the detention and arrest. Consequently, all of the evidence seized during the 
searches of the appellant's vehicle must be ordered suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence that would support the conviction in this case was seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. The appellant's judgment and conviction should be reversed 
and the case remanded to the Fourth District Court with an order requiring the lower court 
to reverse the conviction and withdraw the guilty plea previously entered in this case. 
DATED this 2a day of June, 2002. yf /I 
^ G.FREDMETOS ^ ^ \ 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifVjhat a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this j2^ of June, 2002, to: 
Mark Shurtleff 
Attorney for Appellee 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 /lUM 
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ADDENDUM 
DEREK P. PULLAN, #6633 
Wasatch County Attorney 
THOMAS L. LOW, #6601 
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney 
123 South Main Street, Suite 11 
HeberCity,UT 84032 
Telephone: (435)654-2909 
Fax: (435)654-2947 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW L. DESPAIN, 
DOB: 12/21/1955, 
6945 South Greenfield Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
CaseNo. W)ff$ Ity 
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
The undersigned THOMAS L. LOW, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, committed the following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: CLANDESTINE LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND EQUIPMENT in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4, a second degree felony, as follows: That on or about 
^ November 6, 1999, the defendant knowingly or intentionally 
(a) possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation; 
(b) possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation. 
OUNT 2: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, WITH A 
PRIOR CONVICTION in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a second degree 
felony, as^mlows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the defendant having been previously 
convict&i of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, did knowingly and 
intentionally possess or use Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 
COUNT 1: TRANSPORTATION OR POSSESSION OF ITEMS PROHIBITED IN 
CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-311.3, a third degree felony, as follows: That on or about November 6,1999, the 
defendant (4)(d) without the permission of the authority operating the correctional facility or the 
secure area of a mental healtfrfacility, knowingly possessed at a correctional facility or a secure 
area of a mental health facility any controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana. 
COUNT 4: RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112, a 
class A misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the defendant, under 
circumstances not amounting to a felony offense, recklessly engaged in conduct that created a 
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. 
COUNT 5: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37a-5(l), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the 
defendant did lmowingly,/imentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, 
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 
inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body. 
COUNT 6: CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about November 6, 
1999, the defendant did carry ^concealed dangerous weapon, 
(a) which was not a firearm, on his person or one that is readily accessible for immediate use 
which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his residence, 
/
 property, or business under his control; or 
(b) without a valid concealed firearm permit carried a concealed dangerous weapon which is a 
firearm and that contains no ammunition. 
/ COUNT 7: FORFEITURE DEMAND in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13, a, as 
y follows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the defendant Plaintiff hereby demands forfeiture 
f- of property, which is property the defendant has an interest in, and was seized from said 
*/• defendant as a result of said Count(s) of this Information, and said property being 
(e) a conveyance used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property; to wit: 1973 Black 
Chevrolet Pick-Up Truck, 
(g) something of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Title 58, Chapter 37, Controlled Substances, or moneys, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of 
Utah Code Title^8, Chapter 37, Controlled Substances; to wit($362.00) three hundred sixty two 
dollars in cash.^/ PS1/ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
MATTHEW DESPAIN & 
ANNLDESPAIN, 
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Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 991500176 & 991500177 
DATE: December 7,2000 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument and hearing on Defendants' 
Motion to Suppress on November 15, 2000. Defendants were present and represented by Mark 
A. Besendorfer, Esq., and the State of Utah was represented by Thomas L. Low, Deputy Wasatch 
County Attorney. 
Witnesses were called, evidence received and arguments were made. Since the briefing 
by counsel had only been received by the Court on the day of the hearing, the Court took the 
matter under advisement in order to review the memoranda. Counsel also stipulated that the 
Court could utilize the transcript of the preliminary hearing conducted on January 26, 2000 in 
reaching its decision. 
L 
FACTS 
1. On November 6, 1999, around midnight Officer Troy Slaugh was traveling 
southbound on SR 40, Main Street, in Heber, Wasatch County, Utah. Officer Rusty Olsen was 
traveling in the vehicle with Officer Slaugh who was driving. Officer Olsen was dressed in plain 
clothes, but he did have a gun and badge. 
2. Officer Slaugh observed a truck pulling a fifth wheel trailer and further observed 
that the rear license plate lacked illumination in violation of law; UCA 41-6-120(b). 
3. Before the stop, Officer Slaugh called dispatch with the plate number and learned 
that the vehicle was registered to a Matthew Despain. Officer Slaugh recognized the name 
because about a month before he had been called to the Wasatch County Jail to meet with 
Trooper Kevin Roads in order to perform a drug recognition evaluation on an arrestee; Matthew 
Despain. 
4. Officer Slaugh testified that he knew that Mr. Despain, on the previous occasion, 
had been in possession of a handgun and had been armed and dangerous. 
5. Officer Slaugh stopped the subject vehicle for the license plate violation. As the 
officer approached the vehicle, a large Rottweiler dog in the bed area of the truck jumped out at 
him and was barking hysterically and the officer testified he feared it was going to attack him. 
Because the Rottweiler was aggressive and lunging at him, he drew his firearm and retreated from 
the vehicle. 
6. The officer requested that Mr. Despain, who had exited his vehicle, control his 
dog. The officer further requested that Mr. Despain walk back to him. Mr. Despain, contrarily, 
returned back and got back into the cab of the truck and closed the door. 
7. The officer called to him again and he exited the truck and came back to the 
officer. 
8. Officer Slaugh requested to see his driver's license, and almost simultaneously 
Officer Rusty Olsen, who was standing next to Officer Slaugh, asked him whether he had any 
weapons. 
9. Mr. Despain immediately informed the officers that he had two knives and began 
to reach toward his waist area to show the officers. 
10. Officer Olsen intervened and located the knives. 
11. One knife was located in a sheath on Mr. Despain's belt in a horizontal position 
across his belly. It was a very large, heavy knife approximately a foot long. 
12. The other knife was much smaller and was located in a sheath hanging vertically 
from his belt. 
13. Neither weapon was initially visible to either officer because Mr. Despain had a 
plaid shirt on which was untucked and dropped below the waist area. 
14. Officer Slaugh consulted his State Code in his vehicle and concluded, because of 
the character of, nature of, accessibflity, location, size and sharpness of the large knife and the fact 
that the knife was not securely encased, to charge Mr. Despain with concealing a dangerous 
weapon. 
15. Officer Slaugh went back to Mr. Despain and placed him under arrest for 
possession of a concealed weapon. He then proceeded to make arrangements for conducting a 
"search incident to arrest." 
16. Another officer team, which was patrolling in the area arrived to offer backup to 
Officers Slaugh and Olsen. 
17. Officer Richard Allred, one of these officers, began searching the passenger side 
of the truck cab where co-defendant, Mrs. Despain was seated. He located a zip lock baggy with 
a green leafy substance which appeared like, and smelled like marijuana. In addition he located a 
red plastic container with some green, leafy substance in it and also a glass methamphetamine 
pipe. 
18. Officer Slaugh intended to search the driver's side cab area of the pickup while 
Officer Allred searched the passenger side cab area, but Officer Slaugh was distracted by a small 
child sleeping in the open bed of the trunk. 
19. Shortly after Officer Allred had located and identified suspected controlled 
substances in the cab, Officer Slaugh searched the bed area of the truck, located a backpack/ 
purple bag wherein he found a green leafy substance and a pipe. 
20. Mrs. Despain was placed under arrest, but the purple bag and her purse were 
searched before she was actually arrested. 
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21. The trailer was searched next and various officers located a five foot long glass 
tube and a small glass tube with a rubber connector, which the officers suspected to be 
components of a methamphetamine lab. The search of the trailer was discontinued about 2 a.m. 
Because of the darkness, the extreme cold, and for health, safety and welfare reasons for the 
officers and the public; they thought they might locate hazardous or toxic material. 
22. The truck and trailer were towed to an impound lot at KC Auto. 
23; Later that same morning, about 11 a.m. to noon, after consulting with the county 
attorney, without obtaining a warrant, officers began searching the vehicle and trailer again. A 
100 ml. beaker was located as well as a small mason jar filled with blue iodine crystals. 
24. The officers then summoned DEA officers and also obtained a search warrant. 
A final search was then conducted and officers located some bottles of isopropyl alcohol and 
hydrogen peroxide and some duct tape. 
n. 
LEGAL ISSUES 
Defendant seeks to suppress the evidence based upon the following legal arguments: 
A. The initial stop of the defendants was unlawful; 
B. The detention of the defendants after the stop was unlawful; 
C. The arrest of the defendant was unlawful; 
D. The search of the vehicle and particularly the trailer was unlawful; and 
E. There were no exigent circumstances justifying a continued warrantless search. 
m. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-120 provides: 
(a) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer, 
and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a 
combination of vehicles, shall be equipped with at least two tail 
lamps mounted on the rear, which shall comply with regulations 
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issued by the department; provided, the department may by 
regulation allow one tail lamp on any vehicle equipped with 
only one when it was made, (b) Either a tail lamp or a separate 
lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a 
white light the rear registration plate. Such lamp shall comply 
with requirements of the department. 
Officer Slaugh testified that there was no license plate illumination on the trailer in 
violation of 41-60-120, and that was why he stopped the subject vehicle. The Court finds the 
stop lawful. 
B. The Detention 
As one officer is asking for a license, another officer was asking whether Mr. Despain 
had any weapons. In light of the officer's previously dealings with the defendant, approximately 
thirty days before, he knew that he had been recently armed with a handgun and considered armed 
and dangerous. 
Therefore, in light of the very recent history, the inquiry, for officer safety was 
authorized. When two weapons were located, one being a very large and heavy bowie-type knife 
concealed horizontally on his waist, under a shirt, it was reasonable to detain the defendant 
further. At that time, as pointed out by defense counsel, the scope of the stop is still limited and 
the officer must diligently pursue a means of investigation which is likely to confirm or dispel his 
suspicions quickly. 
Mr. Despain was detained momentarily while the officer reviewed the law. Mr.. 
Despain's detention was very short, pending review of the Code. The Court finds the detention 
lawful. 
C. Was the arrest lawful? 
The statute regarding concealed weapons provides: 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-10-501, which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily 
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accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this 
part, in a place other than his residence, property, or business under his 
control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
76-10-501. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) (a) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that is 
covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not be aware 
of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use. 
The subject knife, long and bowie-like, was located in a sheath placed horizontally 
across the belly-waist area of defendant. It was completely concealed by the untucked shirt. 
Though carried in a sheath, the officer testified that it was not securely encased, that it was easily 
accessible and was very sharp. The Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the 
defendant on the charge of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. It was a dangerous weapon 
and it was "covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not be aware of its 
presence and (was) accessible for immediate use." 
D. The search of the vehicle and the trailer. 
Since the arrest was proper, a search incident to the arrest is authorized by law. It is the 
opinion of this Court that a search incident to arrest of a driver of a vehicle is allowed in the 
interior compantment area of the vehicle. Thus, the search of the cab of the truck was allowed by 
law. Once drugs and drug paraphernalia were located in the cab of the truck, the officers were 
allowed by law to search the truck bed and the fifth wheel utility trailer. The trailer was not a 
house trailer, but a construction-type, open trailer. 
E. Validity of Continued Search 
Officer Slaugh testified that it was dark while the officers conducted the search at the 
scene, and that it was very cold. Officers at the scene searched the truck and trailer for a few 
minutes and then had to get warmed up in their patrol cars. Officer Slaugh further testified that 
-6-
the vehicles were impounded and the search discontinued because of officer safety, cold 
conditions and darkness. 
The Court has already found that the initial searches at the scene were constitutionally 
valid, and that initial search resulted in the discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Probable 
cause to continue a more careful search in a safe and secure setting during daylight was extant. 
There is no need to seek a warrant tQ further search the vehicle or its trailer since there was clear 
justification to continue the search 
DECISION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motions to Suppress are denied. Counsel 
for the State of Utah is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this decision. 
Dated this ^7 day of December, 2000. 
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4th DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW L DESPAIN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991500176 FS 
Judge: LYNN W. DAVIS 
Date: August 15, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sharonj 
Prosecutor: LOW, THOMAS L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BESENDORFER, MARK A. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 21, 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: 551 (Provo) Tape Count: 8:31 
CHARGES 
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/15/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
7. DEMAND FOR FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY - Not Applicable 
- Disposition: 06/15/2001 Bail Forfeiture 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 991500176 
Date: Aug 15, 2001 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 9 month(s) in the Wasatch County Jail. 
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE 
Defendant is authorized work release and therapy release. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The jail time in this case may run concurrent with Case 991500144 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$10000.00 
$9075.00 
$425.00 
$925.00 
Charge # 2 
Total Fine: $10000.00 
Total Suspended: $9075.00 
Total Surcharge: $425.00 
Total Principal Due: $925.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Defendant is ordered to pay the fine at the rate of $50 per month 
to Adult Probation and Parole. 
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Date: Aug 15, 2001 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 270 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report, to the Wasatch County Jail. 
Defendant is to report-'by September 15, 2001. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 925.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Defendant is ordered to enter into a formal, written agreement with 
Adult Probation and Parole within 10 days. 
Defendant is ordered to advise Adult Probation and Parole and this 
Court of a current address at all times. 
Defendant is ordered to appear any time notice is sent. 
Defendant is ordered to comply with all laws. 
Defendant is ordered to enter into and successfully complete 
substance abuse treatment through a provider approved by Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
Defendant is ordered to submit his person, auto, place of residence 
or any property under his control to search for detection of 
alcohol or drugs by the probation officer and submit to drug 
testing at the request of the probation officer. 
Defendant is ordered to use no alcohol or illicit drugs while on 
probation and not frequent establishments where alcohol is the 
chief item of order. 
Defendant is ordered to not frequent places where drugs are used or 
sold, not associate with persons known to use non-prescribed 
substances without prior knowledge of his probation officer. 
Defendant is ordered to maintain full time employment. 
The case may be reviewed after the defendant has served six months. 
Upon his cooperation and compliance with the terms and conditions 
of probation, the Court may consider an early release. 
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istrict Court Judge 
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